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Abstract: This paper presents a multi-platform, open-source application that aims to
protect data stored and shared in existing cloud storage services. The access to the
cryptographic material used to protect data is implemented using the identification
and authentication functionalities of national electronic identity (eID) tokens. All peer
to peer dialogs to exchange cryptographic material is implemented using the cloud
storage facilities. Furthermore, we have included a set of mechanisms to prevent files
from being permanently lost or damaged due to concurrent modification, deletion and
malicious tampering.
We have implemented a prototype in Java that is agnostic relatively to cloud storage
providers; it only manages local folders, one of them being the local image of a cloud
folder. We have successfully tested our prototype in Windows, Mac OS X and Linux,
with Dropbox, OneDrive, Google Drive and SugarSync.
1 Introduction
In recent years we assisted a widespread usage of cloud storage for centrally storing per-
sonal files (e.g. Dropbox). Such cloud storage can either be used for personal benefit or
for sharing information with others. In this last case, cloud storage providers manage the
mechanisms to send sharing invitations and to keep the shared files synchronized among
all the hosts effectively using them. To ease the usage of such shared folders, storage
providers enable users to use in their hosts specific software to handle a mount point in the
local file system to access cloud folders.
In this paper we propose a system, Protbox, for securely sharing files among strongly
authenticated people through many different cloud storage services. The secure sharing
includes four different protection features: (i) confidentiality, to prevent non-authorized
readings, (ii) integrity control, to detect malicious tampering, (iii) protection against un-
wanted file removals, either by malicious or legitimate persons, and (iv) access control
to the shared data based on strong identification and authentication of people, using the
nowadays widespread electronic, personal identity tokens (eIDs for short).
Many governments worldwide have been or are introducing eIDs to allow the identification
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of people in the scope of Internet interactions. Unfortunately, there are several kinds of
eID types being deployed, which reduces the possibilities of using all of them in a single
system requiring the authentication of persons. In our system we considered the case of
the Portuguese eID (Carta˜o de Cidada˜o), which enables the owner to perform two kinds
of signatures upon providing a proper PIN: (i) authentication signature, for online identity
proofs and (ii) qualified signatures, for document signing. In this work we used only
authentication signatures.
Comparing Protbox with similar solutions, it has two main distinctive characteristics: (i)
the key distribution between file sharing persons is performed by means of special files
exchanged through the exact same cloud storage space used for file sharing, thus no extra
services are required other than the trustworthy national PKIs (Public Key Infrastructures)
used to validate eID signatures; and (ii) the files exposed to others by means of cloud
sharing are protected from malicious or involuntary tampering or removal.
Protbox has just two requirements regarding a cloud storage solution for folders and files:
(i) it should allow the sharing of folders by many persons and (ii) it should allow client
operating systems to have a local mount point of the shared folder. Nowadays, most file-
oriented cloud storage solutions, if not all, fulfill these requirements; in our experiments we
managed to explore it successfully with Dropbox, SkyDrive, Google Drive and SugarSync
(see Section 3).
We developed a Protbox prototype in Java. It runs in any operating system with a suitable
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and is capable of recognizing any file system. It features a
background folder synchronization engine and a graphical user interface for dealing with
key distribution requests. Protbox randomly generates and uses a key per folder to protect
all its contents, including files and sub-directories. Files are encrypted with AES and
their integrity is ensured with HMAC-SHA1. Encrypted file names, which contain bytes
that are not acceptable for naming files in existing file systems, are coded in a modified
Base64 alphabet, which should work in most file systems. The prototype was successfully
experimented in Windows, Mac OS X and Linux with all of the above referred cloud
storage providers.
2 Protbox architecture
2.1 Deployment overview
Protbox depends on the local replica of Cloud Folder, which we call Shared Folders
for the effective sharing of protected content. Users must define one-to-one associations
between those Shared Folders and the local folders containing the relevant files to protect,
which we call Prot Folder and may be located anywhere in the host file system. The cloud
storage system will be responsible for synchronizing the contents of Shared Folders with
the correspondent Cloud Folders, which may be shared by a set of cloud storage users.
This cloud synchronization is completely transparent to Protbox, which only has to deal
with the local synchronization between associated Shared Folder - Prot Folder pairs (see
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Figure 1: Overview of the Protbox deployment architecture. The Protbox synchronization will take
place upon Protbox Pairs, which are pairs formed by one Shared Folder and a Prot Folder.
Figure 1). We will refer such pairs as Protbox Pairs.
The Protbox synchronization actions are not simple file copies, but rather content encryp-
tions (when updating files in a Shared Folder) or decryptions and integrity validations
(when updating a Prot Folder). Files in a Prot Folder are in their original formats, as
produced by the creating applications, but their protected replicas in Shared Folders and
Cloud Folders are encrypted, ensuring their confidentiality. The file names of the en-
crypted files are also encrypted to reduce the leakage of file-related information through
the cloud provider.
2.2 Integrated file protection
Protbox attempts to introduce and build a confidential, trustworthy and dependable envi-
ronment on top of existing cloud storage services without disrupting normal usage and
functionality provided by these.
For confidentiality, Protbox encrypts files with a symmetric cipher (e.g. AES). A key is
generated and maintained for each Protbox Pair (hereafter we will call it a Pair Key). Pair
Keys are stored by Protbox in its private, local data repositories and not stored in the cloud.
Each Pair Key is either (i) randomly generated by Protbox (when the first protected file is
created in the corresponding Shared Folder) or (ii) imported by Protbox from other users
sharing the corresponding Shared Folder (when the Shared Folder is not empty). Besides
file’s contents, their names are also encrypted with the same key and written in a modified
Base64 alphabet.
For trustworthiness, file updates in Shared Folders must also be validated taking the corre-
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sponding Pair Keys into consideration: an update can only be accepted if it was made by
someone knowing the correct Pair Key. Otherwise, tampered files in Shared Folders could
originate files with garbage contents in Prot Folders. Therefore, protected files contain a
cryptographic checksum, computed with their Pair Key (e.g. with HMAC-SHA1).
Considering a hierarchical rank of power, a Prot Folder outranks its corresponding Shared
Folder, thus a Prot Folder file cannot ever be permanently damaged or deleted upon a
synchronization event originated from the cloud provider (regardless of the ultimate origin
of the event). Therefore, for dependability the files in each Prot Folder should always be
available for restoring at any time, regardless of the cloud provider’s interpretation of the
files’ status.
The coherence of the files in both of these folders (Prot Folders and Shared Folders) is
assured by maintaining a parallel control data structure containing structural information
about both folders (files and directories, encrypted and decrypted names, last modified
dates, lengths of contents). Coherency checking and synchronization tasks would run on a
periodic basis and use that structural information and the effective contents of each Protbox
Pair to take the appropriate data transfer decisions. Hereafter we will refer to this structural
information as Protbox Registry (PReg for short). Pair Keys are also part of PReg.
Note that a PReg is a local, private data structure that helps a local Protbox instance to take
the appropriate, local decisions regarding file synchronizations, encryptions/decryptions
and recovery actions. In particular, a PReg is never synchronized with another one.
Because we are essentially dealing with asynchronous copies of files from one folder to
another, with encryption and decryption of contents and file names depending on which
folder the file is placed, concurrent file update conflicts can occur. These file conflicts can
be detected because the synchronization method uses the PReg to evaluate each situation
prior to the synchronization itself. On each run of the coherence checking task we create
a index of the files updated (i) only in the Prot Folder, (ii) only in the Shared Folder and
(iii) in both folders. The last ones are our subject of interest in what concerns conflicts.
Consequently, they will be synchronized in a different way, which will lead to the pro-
duction of two versions of the updated file, while the other files will be synchronized in a
straightforward way. This feature also adds dependability to Protbox, because it assures
that conflicting updates are never destructive.
2.3 Agnosticism and autonomy towards cloud storage providers
Some cloud storage solutions do not provide any cryptographic measures to protect the
files they store (e.g. Microsoft’s OneDrive1). Other solutions implement security mecha-
nisms to back up and encrypt files, both in transit and at rest (e.g. Dropbox2), rendering
the service HIPAA-compliant3. However, they cannot guarantee that stored files are only
1http://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/onedrive/wiki/sdfiles-sdperms/
onedrive-and-data-encryption-is-your-data-secured/43ff303b-a6aa-4f02-8c47-b547d6a5ef14
2https://www.dropbox.com/help/27/en
3http://onr.com/secure-server-hosting/what-is-hipaa-compliance/
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decrypted by user request, since the symmetric encryption keys used are managed by the
cloud storage providers. To emphasize the safeguard of files, some providers claim they
have strict privacy policies that prohibit company’s employees from viewing the content
of stored files (e.g. Dropbox4), but while this may be a deterrent measure, it does not
effectively prevent it from happening5.
By realizing this, we designed Protbox as an agnostic solution regarding cloud storage
providers, being independent of both (i) how they store and transfer files and (ii) how
they implement confidentiality and authentication mechanisms [BHH+12]. For Protbox
the only requirements from cloud storage providers are the availability of what we called
a Shared Folder, a replica available in the local file system of a Cloud Folder, and the
synchronization of contents between several Shared Folders for the same Cloud Folder.
Other than the cryptographic methods adopted in order to establish a confidential envi-
ronment, it was equally important that Protbox allowed users to share protected files with
each other. Access to the original contents of protected files by a user should be con-
trolled within Protbox, regardless of who effectively has access to the Cloud Folder, as
determined by the cloud-storage provider. To do so, Protbox implements request-response
dialogs between Protbox instances for exchanging Pair Keys associated to Shared Folders.
These dialogs are implemented with special files stored in Shared Folders. When a Prot-
box instance first establishes an association between a Prot Folder and a Shared Folder, if
the Shared Folder is populated with files then it sends a request to obtain the key to decrypt
them. Such a request will be available to all Protbox instances with Prot Folders associ-
ated with replicas of that Shared Folder, and any of them (upon a user consent) may send
a response with the requested key. This way, Protbox is completely autonomous regarding
key distribution, it does not require any external key distribution service.
2.4 Synchronization of Protbox Pairs
Protbox allows the user to configure a arbitrary number of local Prot Folders to be securely
shared by means of Protbox Pairs. This means that it must be able to properly synchronize
data between the Prot Folder and the Shared Folder that form each Protbox Pair. In addi-
tion, while useful metadata provided by native file systems can be used to detect updates
and synchronization details, it does not contain enough information, such as an history
of modifications and deletions, to properly deal with conflicting scenarios. Therefore, we
cannot fully depend on the native file systems for tacking synchronization decisions.
Consequently, each Protbox instance uses PReg for this task. For each Protbox Pair the
PReg stores its Pair Key and information to detects differences between the Pair’s Prot
Folder and Shared Folder: (i) encrypted and decrypted names of each file of the Pair,
(ii) last modification date, (iii) file length and (iv) file’s cleartext contents. For the Pair’s
directories only the names are stored.
4https://www.dropbox.com/privacy
5https://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/260254/dropbox_gets_a_
black_eye_in_spam_attack.html
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It should be possible to have two or more Protbox Pair for the same Prot Folder; it enables
to share the same Prot Folder through several cloud providers, using a different Pair Key
for each of them. However, the contrary should be impossible: a single Shared Folder
cannot be used by more than one Protbox Pair. The reason for this is that all the contents
of a Shared Folder must be protected with a single Pair Key.
Each encrypted file name results from the encryption of the original name with the Pair
Key, encoded in a modified Base64 alphabet. In this alternative alphabet we replaced
the “/” symbol, which is very often used as a path separator, by “-” (hyphen). For the
encryption/decryption operations we chose the ECB mode and PKCS #5 padding. The
padding helps to hide the real length of the original name.
Protbox monitors the folders of each Pair to detect modifications relatively to the PReg
information. When the modification corresponds to a file insertion in one of the fold-
ers, a new entry is inserted in PReg and the file is replicated in the other folder with the
appropriate encryption or decryption transformation.
When the modification corresponds to a removal of a file or directory, they are similarly
removed from the other folder but not from PReg, where they become marked as hidden.
Furthermore, in the case of files removed in the Shared Folder, the cleartext replica in the
Prot Folder is stored in PReg along with the hidden entry prior to removing them from the
file system, thus enabling Protbox to restore them afterwards upon a user request.
When the modification corresponds to an update of a file in only one of the Pair’s folders, in
practice for Protbox it corresponds to a combined removal of the file and insertion of a new
one in that folder. Upon both these steps, all the parties sharing the same Cloud Folder
with Protbox that receive a new encrypted version of a file will store the old (cleartext)
replica in their PReg.
When the modification corresponds to an update of the same file in both folders of a Pair,
then we have a conflict. In this case, Protbox renames the file in the Prot Folder to include
the name of the local user. Then, it considers both the renamed file and the updated file in
the Shared Folder (which are no longer linked) as independent file insertions. The overall,
distributed outcome of this operation may not be always the same, since several Protbox
instances may compete in this process, in different hosts, without central coordination.
Nevertheless, no files are lost, since these files are never deleted by Protbox.
2.5 Identification and authentication of users
For supporting well-informed decisions by Protbox users to respond positively to Prot
Folder key requests we had to choose a method for identifying and authenticating Protbox
users. We decided to use national eID tokens to achieve both goals, by using their X.509
authentication certificates and their public keys to validate signatures on Pair Key requests
and responses, signed with the corresponding private keys.
By using national eIDs, the access to protected files shared through the cloud only occurs
after a two-factor authentication: the possession of the eID token and the knowledge of a
6
personal identification number (in order to unlock the token’s cryptographic functionali-
ties). This way, the risk of personification by others, namely cloud storage providers, is
dramatically decreased.
In our protection model we didn’t consider the hiding of the users’ identity, expressed in
signatures performed with their eID, from the cloud storage providers. Therefore, these
providers can obtain the real identity of the persons exchanging secure files with Protbox.
Dealing with this security issue is a topic for future work.
2.6 Key Distribution
For the distribution of Pair Keys to individual persons sharing the same Cloud Folder via
Protbox we designed a protocol based on the exchange of special files through the Cloud
Folder. These special files, which are not engaged by Protbox synchronization functions,
are identified by starting with “ ”, which does not belong to our modified Base64 alphabet.
A Protbox instance places a Pair Key request in the Cloud Folder when it needs it to prop-
erly decrypt the contents of a related Shared Folder. The request contains an encryption
public key (belonging to a Key Distribution Key Pair, KDKP) signed by the requester.
This public key should be used by anyone knowing the Pair Key to send it back to the
requester. The signature is made with the eID authentication private key, and the corre-
sponding certificate should go along with the request.
A Pair Key request file has a name that is formed by a leading “ ” and an hexadecimal
representation of a 128-bit random number. This number is generated by the requester
and will be used to match the Pair Key response. Several persons can place simultaneous
requests in the same Cloud Folder, the probability of collision is nearly null. A Pair Key
response will have a similar file name, but with an additional extension formed by an hex-
adecimal representation of another 128-bit random number. This number is generated by
the responder and allows many persons knowing the Pair Key to respond without colliding.
Whenever a Protbox instance detects a Pair Key request in a Shared Folder for which it
knows such key, it checks the request signature and presents the identity of the requester to
the local user, prompting for key distribution authorization. Upon the user authorization,
the Pair Key is ciphered with the requester public key and the response is signed with the
eID of the responder. The goal of this signature is twofold: (i) it allows the requester to
know who provided the Pair Key and (ii) it prevents anonymous attackers from injecting
tampered responses in the Cloud Folder. Note that we cannot prevent Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks against the key distribution protocol (attackers may be able to tamper or
delete Pair Key requests and responses), but we can prevent Protbox users from being
mislead by anonymous attackers providing wrong Pair Keys. We can still have attacks
providing wrong Pair Keys, but since the responses are signed, they are not anonymous.
Pair Key responses are signed tacking into account the request, i.e., the signature is made
upon a hash including the original request (file name and contents). This way, responses
cannot reused, which is advisable to prevent users to be fooled by replayed responses.
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Pair Key requests and the corresponding responses are deleted upon successfully process-
ing a response. It may happen, however, that some responses may be placed in the Cloud
Folder after the deletion of the request. In this case, lost responses (easily detected because
they have no counterpart requests) can be deleted by anyone sharing the Cloud Folder after
an acceptable timeout upon detection of the incoherence.
In our protection we didn’t consider any mechanism to revoke accesses to files in a Shared
Folder. Ultimately, this needs to be explored at the sharing service provided by the storage
provider. Furthermore, we assumed that each person with access to a Shared Folder can
provide a Pair Key response to a key pair request for that folder. More restrictive response
politics (e.g. only one participant is allowed to respond) must be managed at a higher level
with some form of personal agreement. Dealing with such policies is a topic for future
research.
2.7 Management of file content restoration
As previously mentioned, each time a Shared Folder file is updated, the corresponding file
in the Prot Folder is updated accordingly and a backup copy of the replaced file contents
is created. With this basic behavior, files shared among several users by means of Protbox
that go through many small updates are likely to create long lists of backup contents in
many Protbox instances.
To deal with this issue, Protbox instances offer different policies for managing the backup
of updated files, such as: (i) never keep a backup copy (ii) limit the number of backups
to a maximum number of copies (iii) ask the user each time a backup copy is to be made.
Because files have different relevancy levels, these policies can be deployed on a per file
basis.
3 Prototype implementation and experience
A prototype implementing all the features specified in the architecture was developed us-
ing Java, and is available as a open-source project at
https://github.com/edduarte/protbox . Aspects like Java’s native file sys-
tem recognition were used in order to emphasize maximum compatibility. Moreover, be-
cause it runs on any implementation of the Java Virtual Machine, it is compatible with
popular operating systems, such as Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. Licensed third-party
libraries that were used for the development of this prototype (SwingX, ImageJ, JGoodies,
Apache Commons, Guava) are all freely distributed and open-source.
Each Protbox instance uses a different PReg for each local user and uses the user’s home
directory to store it. The PReg is formed by a directory for storing backed up files and
an encrypted file containing a serialized Java data structure with all the user’s Protbox
metadata. This file is encrypted with AES in ECB mode with a key derived from a user
password. This file keeps the user’s KDKP and the random identifiers used in his Pair Key
8
requests; KDKP is generated by Protbox on the first execution.
Pair Key requests are produced by Protbox instances at most once on each run, since they
can be reused for different Shared Folders (while stored in request files with different
names, for preventing response replay attacks). This way, the user signature with his eID
for producing a Pair Key request is required at most once each time his Protbox runs.
Note, however, that the user may be asked to make other signatures with his eID, namely
for producing Pair Key responses.
During start-up, our prototype checks for configuration files added by the user, which
should specify the local path of a eID token PKCS#11 provider and the alias of the au-
thentication certificate contained within said eID token. With this, Protbox allows dynamic
support for any national eID token to sign Pair Key requests and responses.
Protected files always start with an integrity control value. After that, they may contain
an optional initialization vector for an encryption mode (e.g. CBC). Finally, they have the
actual file contents encrypted. The cipher algorithms used for protected files are defined
independently for each Shared Folder. The person that decides it is the same that defines
its Pair Key, which is the first that creates a protected file on it.
Pair Key requests’ and responses’ signatures contain the complete certificate chain of the
signer’s certificate, excluding the root certificate. This facilitates the validations of the
signatures, at the cost of adding more data to those files. But since they are transient,
this is not an issue. Besides the Pair Key, a response also contains the names of the
cryptographic algorithms that are being used to protect the files in the Shared Folder.
For such names we used the strings that are actually used to instantiate cipher objects
using the Java Cryptography Algorithm factory model. Examples of such strings are
“AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding” for a symmetric encryption cipher and “HmacSHA” for
computing an integrity control value.
The prototype was tested in Windows 7, Ubuntu 12.04.4 and Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.4
operating systems with four of the current major cloud storage providers on the market:
Dropbox, Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive and SugarSync. Multiple tests were per-
formed to check if the provider’s synchronization methods displayed considerable loss of
performance, since file encryption is known to interfere with the provider’s synchroniza-
tion techniques [Gee13]. Tests included (i) the creation of a single and of multiple files in a
Prot Folder, (ii) sharing of a Pair Key between several persons, (iii) simultaneous creation
of files in different Prot Folders in different hosts for the same Cloud Folder, (iv) detec-
tion of tampered files in Shared Folders and (v) file deletion detection and (vi) recovery of
deleted files. Unfortunately, it is impossible to describe here all the interactions with the
users that are triggered within many of these tests.
Under normal conditions, the prototype executed every task successfully with all of these
providers and presented no distinguishing differences between them in terms of behav-
ior. Under conditions where the cloud storage service’s permissions features could be set,
when reducing the users’ permission from “read/write” to “read-only”, Protbox could not
cope with it, since it could not even post a Pair Key request in the Shared Folder. How-
ever, since Protbox is by design agnostic from specific features provided by cloud storage
providers, such as this file protection mechanism, this is an expected limitation.
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4 Related Work
In this section we will give an overview of features present in other existing cloud storage
security solutions, implemented as third-party software applications, and effectively com-
pare the overall operations and design of these against Protbox. The analyzed solutions
are BoxCryptor6, Viivo7, CloudFogger8, Sookasa9, TrueCrypt10 and CCE (Citizen Card
Encrypted) [ZSTD13].
Similarly to Protbox, all of these solutions encrypt files from the installed cloud service
with locally generated 256-bit AES keys. As an added effort, Protbox implements integrity
checking of encrypted files to prevent files with garbage from being produced in Prot
Folders of peers. This feature could not be found in the documentation of any of the
analyzed solutions, though it may be in place.
With BoxCryptor and TrueCrypt, plaintext replicas of encrypted files are maintained in a
local virtual disk drive that is created in the user host, which requires a strong integration
with the operating system kernel of the user machine. Other solutions, such as Viivo
and Sookasa, detect a set of well-known, locally installed cloud storage providers, and
are limited to encryption of a single folder (and its sub-files and sub-folders) at the target
cloud storage service (naturaly, the local cloud replica). In contrast, Protbox integrates in a
transparent way with the native file system and prompts the user to freely specify the cloud
replica and prot folders that define a Protbox Pair, making it a more intuitive and flexible
solution. In addition, this flexibility allows the configuration of multiple Pairs based on the
same Prot Folder and different cloud replicas, introducing simultaneous synchronization
and encryption of contents into multiple Cloud Folders, a feature that is not available in
other works.
In regards to local protection, CloudFogger and Sookasa do not replicate files between
two different local folders, instead encrypting and decrypting cloud folder files on-the-fly
according to their actual local usage. Local files, placed at the cloud folder, are always en-
crypted, and are only decrypted to plaintext to the user when the user authenticates himself
within the provided application 11 12. TrueCrypt’s keeps a local mountable file with the
encrypted files, which contents can only be accessed when TrueCrypt is running. Protbox,
like BoxCryptor and Viivo, keeps the decrypted view (prot folder) available locally at all
times, and because the established objective was to just protect files residing in the cloud
folder, it does not have any local protection measures on the prot folder.
For the majority of these solutions, encryption keys and the sharing logic of these is han-
dled within a backend platform available in a web server. Users must implicitly trust web
server’s safeguard. For example, in BoxCryptor, file sharing is targeted to individual files,
6https://www.boxcryptor.com/en/boxcryptor
7http://www.viivo.com
8https://www.cloudfogger.com/en/
9https://www.sookasa.com/
10http://www.truecrypt.org/
11http://support.cloudfogger.com/index.php?/\\Knowledgebase/Article/View/
10/7/how-secure-is-cloudfogger
12https://sookasa.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/200045197-How-do-I-encrypt-files-
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where a random key is generated to encrypt every different file that can be shared with
another single user or with a group of users. This key is then stored in the BoxCryptor Key
Server and made accessible to the intended user or group. As security measures, these
keys are encrypted with cryptographic material generated from the user’s credentials and
stored locally13. The remaining solutions allow the sharing of whole directories with spe-
cific users, generating an encryption key per directory and storing it in the application’s
backend servers, with access limited to those users. The encryption material relevant to
file protection is said to be kept locally, without ever being transferred to these backend
servers. This claim cannot be verified because they are not open-source. Protbox also
bases its file encryption on whole directories, allowing the setting up of multiple simul-
taneous Pair sharing, but by structuring a whole key distribution protocol by transferring
files in the shared folder, Protbox avoid the need to implement a sharing and encryption
logic in a backend service.
The authentication paradigm for all of these solutions, except for CCE, is knowledge-
based, using character-based credentials. These credentials identify different users and
allow intuitive sharing of files, where a user can specify who should obtain access to
encrypted files by stating the corresponding accounts. Protbox, in contrast, uses a strong
ownership-factor authentication method based on national eID tokens to identify different
users during sharing operations.
The usage of eID tokens for authentication in cloud-security was already used by CCE [ZSTD13].
CCE implemented file confidentiality by using the token’s provided encryption and de-
cryption mechanisms, which also means that they are dependent on these mechanisms
being supported by the eID token. Many eID tokens, like the Portuguese Citizen Card,
currently do not support such capabilities, hence cannot provide file confidentiality on
their own. Protbox does not rely on national eIDs having these features. Instead, it only
requires signature capabilities to allow verification of human identity by peers.
For a more controlled sharing protocol, Viivo proposes a mediator-based implementation
where every shared folder has a user with ’moderator’ privileges, which, by default, is the
first user to attain access to said folder. New users must request for permission of access
to the encrypted contents directly to the moderator, and this moderator must constantly
check for and manage these requests. Since there is only one moderator per folder, this
moderator must be familiar with all of the requesting users. With this, a user that is only
known as trustworthy by single or a few users of the shared folder excluding the moderator
will, more likely than not, have his request denied. With Protbox, every single sharing
request is sent in a “multicast” fashion, and the requirements for one of these request to
be accepted is to provide a valid certificate chain and a valid signature and to have at least
one user accept such a request. The reason for our policy is that we don’t have a central
authority for controlling ownership rights over Shared Folders; everyone that has access
to the Shared Folder is a peer with equal rights.
Finally, all of the available solutions place complete trust in the cloud storage provider’s
capacity of protecting files from illegitimate or unwanted deletions and the capability of
backing up files to allow eventual restore of file contents. With that said, and in tune with
13https://www.boxcryptor.com/en/technical-overview#anc02
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Protbox’s intended agnosticism, intentional or accidentally deleted files can be recovered
without depending on the cloud service provider’s own mechanisms.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposed Protbox as a multi-platform solution for cloud storage security, where
data confidentiality and sharing is performed with agnosticism and autonomy towards the
cloud storage service provider. It adapts to the native file system and to existing cloud
storage services without trusting nor requiring their capabilities other than the process of
synchronization to the cloud. Features that might already be implemented by providers like
data recovery are also provided by Protbox as an independent and secure way of restoring
content without the provider’s acknowledgement.
Regarding other similar existing solutions, Protbox does not store and manage user cre-
dentials in a central or distributed service in order to provide key sharing functionality.
Instead, it uses the cloud environment and the synchronization of files on Shared Folders
to enable peer-to-peer exchange of cryptographic material. In addition, while other solu-
tions use convenient but weak password-based authentication measures to identify users,
Protbox uses a strong eID-based identification and authentication paradigm exploring na-
tional eID tokens. The end result of this is that, while other cloud security solutions rely on
transferring trust from the storage service systems to their own systems, with Protbox the
user does not need to trust any additional services other than existing PKI infrastructures
for eID exploitation.
Finally, Protbox protects the files shared through cloud storage from being deleted or dam-
aged intentionally or accidentally. This is achieved by keeping local backup copies of files
modified upon a modification triggered by the cloud provider.
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